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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Petitioners object to Respondents' "Statement of Issues 
Presented on Appeal and Standard of Appellate Review." Respondents 
assert for the first time that Petitioners' claim of 
ineffectiveness for counsel's failure to pursue a direct appeal is 
"moot." This issue was not raised in the trial Court and should 
not be considered on appeal. 
INTRODUCTION 
Petitioners in this particular case assert they did not 
receive the representation to which they were entitled by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. (R270). The 
benchmark for judging the claims of ineffectiveness is whether 
counsel's conduct undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process. See e.g.. State v. Tennyson, 850 P. 2d 461 
(Utah App. 1993). 
The record shows that the most fundamental procedures of the 
adversarial criminal process were not employed by Petitioners' 
counsel. The court records in Petitioners' criminal cases indicate 
their counsel did not file formal discovery despite Petitioners' 
requests. The limited discovery counsel did have was not shared 
with Petitioners. Petitioners were never advised, until the 
discovery in this proceeding, that the key testimony against them 
would come from confidential informants. 
In addition, Petitioners have testified that their attorneys 
erroneously told them that they must plead guilty and that if they 
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did they would serve only five years in prison. These statements 
came in a meeting in which Petitioners were intimidated and 
coerced. Finally, Petitioners claim their counsel were ineffective 
because they failed to keep their promises to assist Petitioners 
before the Board of Pardons and to assist them in motions to 
withdraw their pleas and in their appeals. 
Petitioners have further testified that but for their 
counsel's errors, they would have insisted upon a trial of the 
charges made against them and they would have raised their 
effectiveness claims on direct appeal. Thus, Petitioners have 
directly asserted the prejudice required by Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
Respondents, in their brief, request the Court to affirm the 
finding that Petitioners have not shown prejudice and request the 
Court, for the first time, to refrain from considering the issues 
of ineffectiveness relating to Petitioners' appeal because it is 
"moot." 
Petitioners respectfully assert that the trial court, and 
Respondents, have had to make unsupported assumptions that are not 
justified by the record to conclude Petitioners have not shown 
prejudice. Petitioners further assert that Respondents' argument 
that Petitioners' claims are "moot" is untimely and without merit. 
Petitioners will address each one of Respondents' arguments in 
the order in which they are made. Because the crux of the trial 
court's ruling is that Petitioners did not show prejudice, 
particular effort will be made to show that they have. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Standard of Review Allows a Reversal of the Trial Court 
Respondents properly set forth that Petitioners' claims of 
ineffective counsel present mixed questions of law and fact and 
that the trial court's legal conclusions must be reviewed de novo. 
(Respondents' Brief at 2). When they address the trial court's 
legal conclusion that Petitioners did not show prejudice, 
Respondents argue the trial court made a factual finding that 
Petitioners' testimony was not credible. (.Id. at 14). 
There is not a finding that addresses the credibility of 
Petitioners. (Appellants' Brief, Addendum "B") . Thus, the 
linchpin of Respondents' argument is missing. Since there is no 
such finding, the Court should remand for further fact finding, or 
reapply the facts, and permit Petitioners to withdraw their pleas. 
See e.g., Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, 
§32.3, p. 511 (1988). 
II. 
Respondents Omit Many Key Facts 
in Their Statement of Facts 
Respondents' Statement of Facts is one sided. Respondents 
primarily rely on a deposition of Mr. Dean Hickman's counsel that 
is shallow and obviously biased. (Respondents' Brief, Addendum F) . 
Even the trial court's sparse factual findings do not conform to 
this deposition. 
Petitioners assert the most credible testimony, together with 
exhibits, shows that their counsel's representation fell below an 
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objective standard of reasonableness. Counsel did not take the 
steps necessary for the adversarial process to work. Significantly 
important is the fact, accepted by the trial court, that counsel 
did not show their clients the limited information that they had so 
that Petitioners could intelligently and knowingly determine to go 
to trial. Petitioners both testified that had they known of the 
evidence against them, they would have insisted upon a trial. 
A. Discovery 
Petitioners claim that their counsel did not make a discovery 
demand, did not obtain the necessary discovery and did not share 
the discovery in their possession with Petitioners. (R5; R220; 
R246). This means counsel failed to disclose to Petitioners that 
the State's key witnesses were informants receiving favorable 
treatment from prosecutors for their testimony. (id.). Both 
Petitioners testified that the first time they learned of this was 
during the discovery phase on their petition for post conviction 
relief and that had they known it at the crucial plea bargain stage 
they would not have entered their pleas. (R231; R255).x 
The evidence in the record supports Petitioners. The court 
files in Petitioners' criminal cases did not contain discovery 
demands. (R202) . This was very unusual. Even the trial court 
indicated it could not remember a file where court appointed 
1
 The State argues that Petitioners have not demonstrated the 
discovery would have disclosed exculpatory information. It was 
certainly exculpatory information that the State's case was based 
upon confidential informants who had made a deal with the 
prosecution. 
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counsel did not make a formal request. (Petitioners' Brief, 
Addendum "A" at 2) .2 
Petitioners testified that they asked their attorneys to 
engage in discovery. (R191; R219). Petitioner Dean Hickman also 
testified that his requests were met with the response that "it was 
not necessary" (R217) . The trial court found counsel did not share 
the limited discovery in their possession with Petitioners or 
discuss it with any specificity. (Petitioners' Brief, Addendum "A" 
at 3) . 
Respondents do not even mention these findings in their brief. 
Instead, they rely upon a statement made by Dean Hickman's counsel 
that she received "all" discovery and felt "no necessity" to file 
for additional discovery materials. (Respondents' Brief at 6) . 
The statement is lightly made in the deposition attached to the 
Respondents' Brief as Addendum F. 
In making her statement, Mr. Hickman's criminal case counsel 
fails to acknowledge that the practice was to make a discovery 
demand with an appearance of counsel. The failure to do so was not 
strategy. Counsel also fails to acknowledge there were threatened 
but never filed charges for which there had been no discovery. 
Virtually every witness acknowledges that these threatened charges 
were a reason for Petitioners' plea of guilty, and Petitioners 
testified they did not have information about them. (R200; R217; 
2
 The court's observation that it had not seen a case 
involving court appointed counsel where a discovery demand had not 
been made emphasizes the fact that the failure to make a demand in 
this case was not a matter of "strategy." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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R243). It is well established that counsel's failure to 
investigate underlying facts is not reasonable representation. 
State v. Tvler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Utah 1993). 
Furthermore, Respondents do not mention that the only expert 
testimony in the record in this case indicated that a failure to 
file a discovery demand, a failure to provide the discovery to the 
client and a failure to discuss it with the client would not be 
reasonable representation (R180-185). 
B. Plea Negotiations 
Respondents also ignore crucial facts and rely on selected 
testimony when they address Petitioners' claims that the plea 
negotiations were so coercive that there could not be a voluntary, 
intelligent waiver of Petitioners' right to trial. 
To argue that Petitioners' counsel were not coercive, 
Respondents principally cite very limited testimony from Mr. Dean 
Hickman's attorney that "there was the potential for other charges 
out there" and that she only "advised" Petitioner Dean Hickman that 
"it was in his best interest" to plead guilty to one count of 
aggravated robbery "without a firearm enhancement." (Respondents' 
Brief at 7). 
Respondents do not mention that Mr. Hickman's attorney did not 
conduct any discovery on these other charges. The record also 
indicates she did not make certain that the gun enhancement did not 
become part of the sentence. Nearly three years after the plea, 
Mr. Hickman's counsel wrote to him to advise that there had been 
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such an enhancement. (R225-227; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3, attached as 
Addendum "A" hereto). 
This is crucial when considering Respondents' argument that 
Petitioners were not coerced or intimidated because counsel told 
Mr. Dean Hickman that he would serve from five years to life. 
(Depo. at 5-6, 9). The gun enhancement itself would require Mr. 
Dean Hickman to serve more than five years. 
Respondents do not persuasively contradict Petitioners' 
testimony that they plead guilty, in part, when counsel said that 
they would assist in parole hearings. (R218). This promise was 
confirmed by Dean Hickman's counsel. (Respondents' Brief, Addendum 
F at 9) . Mr. Dean Hickman further testified that he told his 
counsel in advance about the parole hearing. She then told him 
that she did not have to appear once he entered his plea. (R227). 
In fact, counsel never appeared with Petitioners either to withdraw 
their pleas, to address the parole board or to file an appeal. 
(R227). 
Respondents also fail to address Petitioners' claim that their 
counsel were ineffective just before their pleas were taken in the 
district court because they did not communicate with them. It is 
without dispute that counsel did not communicate at all with 
Petitioners between the time of their circuit court appearance and 
their appearance in the district court. (R223-224; R247-248). 
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After that Petitioners hastily plead guilty with counsels' 
coaching.3 (R224-226; R247-251). 
C. Detective Don Bell 
In their Brief, Respondents next try to suggest that Detective 
Don Bell was not present during the attorney/client meeting which 
occurred just before Petitioners entered their pleas. 
(Respondents' Brief at 8) . The testimony is quite clear that 
Detective Bell was present during part of the attorney/client 
meeting. 
Mr. Rick Hickman's counsel verified this by his testimony but 
could not recall whether Detective Bell was present at times 
confidential information was discussed. (R201). Petitioner Rick 
Hickman, however, was quite clear when he testified that Detective 
Bell was present at times when confidential matters were discussed. 
(R241). The trial court specifically found that Detective Bell was 
present during the attorney/client meeting. (Appellants' Brief, 
Addendum "A"). 
Rather than acknowledge that Detective Bell was present, 
Respondents suggest in footnote 3 at page 9 of their Brief that 
Detective Bell may have attended the meeting but that he was not 
present during the time confidential communications occurred. 
3
 Respondents argue that the plea transcripts do not indicate 
coaching or statements by counsel. The absence of statements is 
not surprising when the transcripts are reviewed. The reporter 
recorded statements between the court and counsel. Communications 
between Petitioners and their attorneys were not recorded. It is 
unlikely that counsel did not say anything to their clients during 
the pleas. It is far more likely that what they said was not 
recorded. 
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(Respondents' Brief at 9) . The record does not support this 
assumption. The best that Respondents can cite is the deposition 
testimony in which Dean Hickman's counsel first stated that it was 
not true that Mr. Bell was present but went on to say she had 
"insufficient information" about the matter "to be able to answer 
anything more specifically about it." (Respondents' Brief, 
Addendum F at 6). 
I")i reel" Appeal 
Respondents rely on Dean Hickman's attorney's statement that 
he did not ask her to pursue a direct appeal on his behalf and on 
Rick Hickman's attorney's statements that he could not recall if he 
was asked to appeal. Petitioners testified they did contact their 
attorneys for this purpose and did request an appeal. (R228; 
R251) . The trial court did not resolve this dispute, but 
Petitioners' testimony is more credible. It is consistent with 
Petitioners' filing motions to withdraw their pleas and their 
pursuit of this petition. All criminal defendants, including the 
indigent, have a constitutional right to a timely appeal. State v. 
Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981). 
Petitioners Did Not Receive Appellate Review of Their 
Effective Assistance of Counsel Claims and the 
Trial Court Erroneously Refused to Address Them 
Respondents argue that Petitioners' claim to ineffectiveness 
of counsel concerning the failure to pursue a direct appeal is 
"moot" because Petitioners received appellate review of the denial 
of their motions to withdraw their guilty pleas. (Respondents' 
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Brief at ll).4 This argument was not raised in the trial court. 
It should be rejected as untimely. 
As noted in Petitioners' opening Brief, an appeal was taken 
from the district court's denial of Petitioners' motions to 
withdraw their pleas. State v. Hickman, 779 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1989) . 
The appeal primarily examined the factual basis for the pleas 
because no property was taken by Petitioners. Id. at 671. 
The Utah Supreme Court also examined the claim of Dean Hickman 
that the trial court failed to ask him, before accepting his plea, 
whether his plea of guilty was entered free from threats, promises, 
and inducements. The Supreme Court held that it did not matter 
since Mr. Dean Hickman had signed a plea affidavit and responded to 
other questions from the Court. Id. at 672. 
The Supreme Court's opinion does not address the issues 
presented by the petition for post conviction relief. Nothing in 
the opinion suggests that the Supreme Court even considered claims 
of ineffectiveness of counsel. 
Moreover, Respondents erroneously argue for the first time 
that Petitioners' claim that counsel should have assisted them in 
taking an appeal is "moot" because Petitioners are now receiving 
"appellate review of their ineffectiveness allegations." This 
argument ignores the trial court's oral statements in this case 
4
 The two cases cited by the Respondents are not on point. 
In Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43 (Utah 1981) and Spain v. Stewart, 
63 9 P. 2d 166 (Utah 1981) the Court found petitions for writs of 
habeas corpus to be moot because the confinement about which the 
petitioners complained had been resolved. In this case the 
Petitioners, who are still affected by their counsel's conduct, 
strongly desire to withdraw their pleas and go to trial. 
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that it would not consider many of Petitioners' claims because they 
should have been raised on direct appeal. Thus, there has not been 
a finding or legal conclusion on these claims for this Court to 
"review." 
As noted in Petitioners' opening Brief, the trial court's 
decision to not examine the claims was erroneous. (Appellants' 
Brief, pg. 20-22) . It is well established that Petitioners' claims 
may be considered for the first time on a petition for post 
conviction relief. Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315 (Utah 1992); 
Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989); Hurst v. Cook, 
777 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989). This is particularly true in a 
case like this because it was counsel's lack of effectiveness that 
caused the issues to not be heard. Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P. 2d 
547, 549 (Utah 1989). 
TV 
The District Court Erroneously Determined that 
Petitioners Failed to Demonstrate Prejudice 
There is no dispute in this case that Petitioners must 
demonstrate that: 1) specific acts or omissions fall outside the 
wide range of professionally competent assistance; and 2) counsel's 
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
The main dispute in this case for the purposes of this appeal 
is whether the trial court properly concluded that Petitioners 
failed to prove that they would have insisted on going to trial but 
for their counsel's ineffectiveness. Both Petitioners testified 
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they would have insisted upon a trial had their counsel acted 
reasonably. 
Respondents claim that the trial court has the responsibility 
of ascertaining the credibility of witnesses and "apparently did 
not find the Petitioners testimony credible." Respondents Brief at 
14 (citing Sprouse v. Jecrer, 806 P.2d 219, 222 (Utah App. 1991) 
(giving great deference to a trial court's findings in a civil case 
where there was conflicting testimony). 
There is nothing in the trial court's findings of fact or 
conclusions of law to suggest the trial court weighed the 
credibility of Petitioners' testimony. The trial court's findings 
do not reveal, one way or the other, that it believed or did not 
believe Petitioners. 
The only thing in all of the comments of the trial court that 
would suggest a basis for his conclusion that prejudice was not 
shown was an oral comment that there were other proceedings and 
threats of other proceedings. (Appellants' Brief, Addendum A ) . 
Respondents make similar comments in their brief when they assert 
Petitioners would not have gone to trial because of other charges. 
The trial Court did not and Respondents do not point to any 
testimony where Petitioners indicate they would not have insisted 
upon a trial. The trial court's conclusion that prejudice was not 
shown was impermissible speculation because Petitioners' testimony 
is just opposite. 
This case is like Garmon v. Lockhart, 938 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 
1991) . In Garmon, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals found that a 
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criminal defendant met both prongs of Strickland where his counsel 
gave him erroneous information on which he based his decision to 
plead guilty. The court affirmed the lower court's holding that 
the defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel when 
his attorney incorrectly informed him that he would have to serve 
only one-sixth of his plea bargain sentence. 
The State in Garmon, like Respondents in this case, tried to 
argue that the threat of a longer prison term than provided for in 
the plea was the incentive for the plea. The defendant testified 
he would have gone to trial and risked a longer prison term had he 
received proper advice from his counsel about the length of time he 
would have to serve. 
Petitioners in this case are just like the petitioner in 
Garmon. They have specifically indicated they would have risked a 
trial had they known of the true nature of the evidence against 
them and had they known that they would not be released at the end 
of five years. 
Finally, Respondents note in their Brief that Petitioners did 
not testify that they would have insisted upon a trial absent 
counsel allowing Detective Bell to attend confidential plea 
discussions. Although there is no direct testimony, it is part of 
the overall claims that Petitioners make. As stated by the United 
States Supreme Court in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 
(1970) , the reviewing court must take into account all of the 
relevant circumstances surrounding the plea bargain. 
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Relevant circumstances in this case include the fact that the 
plea was a product of a meeting held contemporaneous to a 
preliminary hearing on another case. In the meeting Detective Don 
Bell threatened other charges. Rather than investigate the 
threatened charges, Petitioners' counsel told them that they had to 
plead guilty. Without being informed of the evidence against them 
for any of the crimes with which they were charged or with which 
prosecution was threatened, and being assured that they would spend 
no more than five years in prison and would be accompanied by their 
counsel to the parole board hearings, Petitioners plead guilty. 
V. 
The District Court Erred in Not Determining 
Whether Counsel's Performance Was Deficient 
As its last argument, Respondents suggest the district court 
was not required to determine whether counsel's performance was 
deficient. (Appellees' Brief at 16). The oral rulings of the 
trial court indicate that it felt, in some instances, that 
counsel's performance was deficient: 
"The Court does feel that it's clear from the record 
that the physical discovery materials that [Dean 
Hickman's] counsel had were not shared. It's clear to 
the Court that, other than in a conclusory way, she 
didn't discuss those apparently with great specificity." 
Thus, as a matter of accuracy, the trial court did indicate that 
Petitioners had shown errors by their counsel in some instances. 
However, as set forth at pages 9-10, supra, the district court 
erroneously failed to determine whether counsel's performance, as 
it related to Petitioners' claims of intimidation and coercion, was 
unreasonable. 
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The district court compounded its error when it found 
Petitioners would not have insisted on going to trial. There is 
insufficient factual or legal support for its conclusion. The 
Court should reverse the trial court because Petitioners have shown 
they would have insisted upon a trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, and the arguments set forth in their 
opening brief, Petitioners respectfully request the Court reverse 
the district court's denial of the petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Petitioners/Appellants believe oral argument would assist in 
the decision process and therefore request oral argument under Rule 
29 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this 27th day of April, 1995. 
COLLARD, APPEL & WARLAUMONT 
^ameslT. Warlaumont 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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I hereby certify on this 2C7— day of April, 1995, that I 
caused and true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of 
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